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B.: Practice and Procedure--Alias Process--When It Must Issue
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
cause of action arose there. There being a corporate defendant,
the case falls within the'second section of the venue statute, and the
process did not have to be served on the natural defendalat in the
county in which the action was brought.10 Though there had been
no corporate defendant, there is nothing on the face of the declaration or in the writ to show that the defendant did not reside in
Nicholas County; and where the declaration and writ are silent as
to the residence of the defendant, and there is nothing to show
improper matter for a court of general jurisdiction, we cannot
assume that the action has been improperly brought.11 Since there
was nothing to show the want of jurisdiction of the court either
on the face of the declaration or in the writ, the motion of the
defendant to quash was properly overruled, and the proper way to
have attacked it would have been to have appeared specially and
pleaded the defect in abatement.12 The defendant, not having so
appeared and pleaded, is presumed to have waived any defects,
and the judgment rendered against the natural defendant is valid
under either section of the venue article.
E. E. T., JR.
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IssuE.-A summons was issued in August, returnable to September Rules, and was returned unexecuted. An alias summons was
then issued, returnable to October Rules, which was also returned
unexecuted. On the first day of November Rules, two pluries
summonses were issued, one returnable that day and the other
returnable at December Rules, the latter pluries summons returned
executed. The certified question from the circuit court was whether
10 There was no inhibition under the old statute, where suit was brought in
the county in which a defendant resided, against sending the process to another
county and serving it on the defendant there, and under the present statute it Is
expressly authorized; and it seems that it should not be different under the
statute which presumably this action was brought, and the presumption in
favor of the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction should work in both
instances.
11 Empire Coal & Coke Co. v. Hull Coal & Coke Co., 51 W. Va. 474, 41 S. E.
917 (1902); W. VA.COD. (Michie, 1937) c. 56, art. 4, § 31.
12 Wilson v. Ritz, 96 W. Va. 397, 400, 123 S. E. 63 (1924): "The bill clearly
'shows on its face proper matter for the jurisdiction of the court;2 therefore,
no exception for want of such jurisdiction could be taken except by plea in
abatement."
Morgan v. Pennsylvania R. R., 148 Va. 278, 138 S. E. 566 (1927); Seaboard
Air Line By. v. J.E. Bowden & Co., 144 Va. 154, 131 S. E. 245 (1926); Gunnoe
v. W. Va. Poultry Ass2n, 115 W. Va. 87, 174 S. E. 691 (1934); Empire Coal &
Coke Co. v. Hull Coal & Coke Co., 51 W. Va. 474, 41 S. E. 917 (1902); W. VA.
CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 56, art. 4, § 31.
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or not the fact that there was no summons issued at October Rules
brought about a discontinuance. This was answered in the negative.
Held, that the practice in this state is not to riquire an uninterrupted succession of writs, but only that no succeeding rules shall
pass without process returnable or outstanding. Vogler v. Ireland.,
Before the decision in the principal case, our court had not
decided this precise point of procedure. Judge Burks had expressed the opinion that process should be continuous, the evil of
a contrary practice being that a plaintiff could continue his case
indefinitely. 2 This is the accepted rule in some jurisdictions.' Although it seems that our court did not adopt his view, still, a West
Virginia case quotes Burks and says by way of dictum that the
"soundness of this proposition is unquestioned" where the action
is in personam and the jurisdiction of the court depends on personal service. 4 A later case tends to disregard the narrow limits
of Burks' rule and recognizes the possibility that an. alias writ
might be issued within a "reasonable time" after the rule day to
which the original process was returnable. 5 Following this decision,
it was a matter of conjecture as to what constitutes a "reasonable
time" in the contemplation of our court, until the instant case was
decided. Now it may be said that the rule in this state is clear
and unequivocal.
On the other hand, other jurisdictions have adopted the contrary line of authority which holds, in effect, that the plaintiff
need not have process issued continuously.6 Indicative of the
110 S. E. (2d) 792 (W. Va. 1940).
2 "It would seem that process to commence a suit must be continuous until
a return of I executed' is obtained, and therefore that the alias or pluries summons can only issue at the rules at which the previous process was returned unexecuted; that a failure then to issue the alias or pluries would cause a hiatus
in the action and operate a discontinuance; and that to hold otherwise would
be to permit a plaintiff to continue his case indefinitely at the rules and save
the running of the statute of limitations for any length of time he chose."
BuRKs, PL ADInG & PRAcTiCE (1913) 290. Contra: Virginia Fire & Marine Ins.
Co. v. Vaughan, 88 Va. 832, 14 S. E. 754 (1892). This question is now settled
in Virginia by a statute which provides that the clerk issue process at each rules
without action of plaintiff, VA. CODE (Michie, 1936) § 6059.
2 "A discontinuance results from the voluntary act of plaintiff in not going
Penniman v.
on regularly by the issue of successive connecting process."
Daniel, 91 N. C. 431, 434 (1884). Accord: Johnson v. Mead, 58 Mich. 67, 24
K. W. 665 (1885); Hazelhurst v. Morris, 28 Md. 67 (1867).
4See Byrd v. Rector, 112 W. Va. 192, 196, 163 S. E. 845 (1932).
5 Dunaway v. Lord, 114 W. Va. 671, 173 S. B. 568 (1934).
eMcClurg v. Fryer & Anderson, 15 Pa- St. 293 (1850). Here the alias was
issued within five years of the original and it was held that this tolled the
Statute of Limitations. The court said, at page 295: "We will not say that
the demand might not be barred, if the plaintiff delayed six years before issuing
(Italics supplied.) It does not appear that the Pennsylvania court
his alias."
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extremities to which such a practice may go is a District of
Columbia case,7 in which no process issued for two years; and a
Pennsylvania case' which states the requirement that the alias be
issued within six years after the original writ was issued.
What is the practical value of the West Virginia rule? It
appears from the cases that this point becomes material only in
instances where the plaintiff desires either to toll the Statute of
Limitations or to avoid payment of costs for the institution of a
new action and issuance of original process therein. It may safely
be said that a litigant in this state may now prevent both the running of the Statute of Limitations and payment of additional court
costs by having process returnable or outstanding on each rule day.
Thus, it seems that the West Virginia court has reached a
sound conclusion between the two extremes, avoiding the liberal
result of other jurisdictions, and at the same time curing the evil
mentioned by Judge Burks, without adopting his strict view.
H. P. B., JR.
TAXATION-"APPORTIONMENT"

OF INCOmE

DERIVED r0o

INTERSTATE AND INTRASTATE AcTIvITIES FOR TiE PuRPosrs OF STATE

TAxATioN.-Under four Federal Government contracts, P constructed locks and dams within the territorial jurisdiction of West
Virginia. Payments were made in installments-some upon construction of materials at P's shops in Pittsburgh, title therein immediately vesting in the Government, others upon delivery at the
work site of these and other materials purchased outside of the
state by P-with final payments upon installation in the dams.
Under the West Virginia gross sales tax' (a privilege tax upon
the subject of "engaging or continuing within the state in the
business of contracting" being measured by the gross income of
the business 2), D tax commissioner based the assessment on P's
based its holding upon any statutory provision, but more on laches, as shown by
the case of O'Neills' Estate, 29 Pa. Super. 415 (1905), in which the court declared a discontinuance where alias was not issued for nearly seven years, saying,
at page 420: "We are of bpinion that the decree of the learned court below
was right and that it ought to be sustained on the ground of laches, even if in
Quaere, on what is this
strictness the statute of limitations is not a bar."

seeming limitation of six years based?

7Parsons v. Hill, 15 App. D. C. 532 (1900).

s Curcier's Estate, 28 Pa. St. 261 (1857).
Statute was sustained as api W. VA.CODn (Michie, 1937) c. 11, art. 13.
plied to mining in Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 102 W. Va. 272, 135 S. E.
582 (1926), 274 U. S 284, 47 S. Ct. 639, 71 L. Ed. 1049 (1927).
2 W. VA. CODE (Micte, 1937) c. 11, art. 13,
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